Mind theory: seeing ourselves -part 1

I am providing a summary to support initial discussions facilitated by two distinguished scholars. 

Both Raymond Tallies -“Seeing Ourselves” published in 2020 and Rodolfo R Llinas -“I of the Vortex” published in 2002 provide contrasting commentary.    

Author Profiles and summary background.   

Raymond Tallis believes we are both part of nature and apart from it. He asserts it is only when we have broken away from dogmatic religion and scientific naturalism that we will find ourselves on the threshold of unfettered inquiry- into ourselves, the world we have built and the universe into which we have built it - and then there may be some hope for salvation.

He has an interesting background, as a Professor of Geriatric Medicine and a fellow of the Academy of Medical sciences in recognition of his research into clinical neuroscience. In 2006 he retired to become a writer and developed a rather obvious passion as a philosopher. I became interested in his ideas as he wrote a regular interesting column for ‘Philosophy Now’ entitled “Tallis in Wonderland”. I also have also recently enjoyed reading his publication ‘In Defence of Wonder’.

Rodolfo R. Llanas, is considered the founding father of modern brain science and presents his evolutionary view as to the nature of the mind. According to the summary provided, he traces the evolution of the mind through a primitive animal called the “sea squirt”. This exotic creature receives sensory information about the surrounding environment. 

In my view he provides a credible foundational beginning for the nervous system which has evolved to ensure active movement in animals. His commentary ably demonstrates how the environmental issues allow a creature to safely move on by anticipating the outcome of each movement- from incoming sensory data. This predictive capacity becomes the most likely ultimate brain function- within the 'self' to house predictive capability. Moving on to the current view of consciousness, he describes energized oscillation of neurons as the the heart of his theory-  many neurons, possessing electrical activity, in three minute voltages across the cell membrane. On the crests of these oscillations occur large electrical events which are the basis for neuron to neuron communication. He describes this mind activity as like cicadas chirping in unison, a group of neurons oscillating can resonate in phase with a distant group of neurons. This simulator of neurons is the neurobiological root of cognition. Through the internal state that we call the mind it is guided by the senses, but it also generates by way of oscillations within the brain. Thus, in a certain sense he maintains reality is not an “out there” but rather we live in a kind of virtual reality. 

In summing up he is a philosopher of the mind who developed his comprehensive synthesis based on an elaboration on neuronal integration and synaptic transmissions. As such it represents a highly credible and interesting theory. But nevertheless, from my perspective, it does require a bit too much of a leap in faith, to seamlessly translate into our rich existential conscious experiences.    

Introduction.

I have attempted to include the essential elements of the respective author’s views which predominantly references the earlier sections. Notwithstanding they mostly form the backbone of later elaborations. I will issue a subsequent discussion paper for the remaining sections down the track. 

However, it is to be noted the summary on Tallis will be significantly much more comprehensive simply because his book is much larger.     

At the outset, to reiterate, the major difference to be noted concerns the approach taken by Llinas, which, although it represents an interesting theory, does require a leap in faith in my view, to accept his theory humans engaging in activities as diverse as sharing information, creating art, literature and so on arose via the evolutionary journey. 

However, in part 2, I will take a closer look at more of the respective abstract issues later on in the respective publications.  For instance in the latter part of Tallis's book he talks about the elusive inescapable self and finding meaning in life. Although Lianas tends to stick to the more concrete matters he does also talk about more abstract matters later on. There are some interesting commentary on patterns, emotions, qualia and collective memory.  

These aspects will be covered in a subsequent post once I have established the foundational theory for the respective commentaries.      

Turning to Tallis his quest, whilst accepting the monstrous, glorious, unexplained and strange form of our identity and selfhood is to see ourselves in a new light in the 21st century. In the process he argues against the isms such as: scientism, naturalism and the obsessive emphasis as he sees it on Darwin's evolution.  

 Against Naturalism - neither ape nor angel. 

Tallis argues against the seductive false lure (as he sees it) that follows on in rejecting the image and handcrafting image of a GOD, (as in we are created in GOD's image) to falsely place reliance in the processes observed through nature. Under that scenario humanism and naturalism must be close allies- a proposition Tallis rejects.

He defines naturalism as any entities described by physics or as biological beings.

His initial question is to ask how we can entertain such a total reliance on natural theory, bearing in mind the vastness of our world and the tiny slither we have in direct contact with it. He notes the response of the scientific community has been that the answer is within those physical laws of nature that verify the materialistic view. But the problem is, when we go in search of those answers we find they are rooted in materialistic naturalism involving panpsychism- the presence of mind that must be present through the universe, which by no means can be substantiated in any meaningful or logical manner.   

But Tallis’s main thrust is his objection to evolutionary theory to posit we are just another biological being.  

Whilst acknowledging his own commitment to science, inclusive of his own research into neuroscience over many years and as a scientist, he asserts there is no hard evidence against our uniqueness as human beings, 

He acknowledges himself as a committed Darwinian, aware of the early awakening when assumptions were made about our first primate ancestors who began to walk upright several million years ago. Thereafter that liberation afforded additional freedom in the use of the human hand and the domination of the visual senses. But within that process no credible explanation exists for our ensuing complexity, other than vague links to adaptability. He does not argue against the idea of consciousness that is evident in the animal kingdom, but rather sets out his defence of our human uniqueness that sets us apart.

I don’t propose to detail all of his concessions about single cellular to unicellular and ongoing complexity or the numerous other analyses. Rather, to drill down into his day to day examples of experiences indicative of our uniqueness. For instance he asks the question, if an animal has one identifiable sense of upper level consciousness, why isn’t it apparent in other aspects of its life in everyday occurrences? Wouldn't it exhibit that unique quality more consistently over other life forms in ongoing examples in its life cycle? Some of the more important distinctions will be covered in later chapters such as the aspect concerning the ability of humans to think’ in respect to tensed time, that makes this point even more convincing.

But the fact is, he acknowledges, by studying in much more detail the day to day interactions of the upper echelons of the animal kingdom one gets a far greater insight into our own uniqueness. This aspect was expressed by Jane Goodall. It’s only in understanding the real ways in which chimpanzees and men show similarities that we can reflect, with meaning, on the way in which men and chimpanzees differ. And only then can we begin to appreciate, in a biological and spiritual manner, the full extent of man’s uniqueness. 

Darwinite’s 

To reiterate, Tallis opposes evolutionary theories that propose we can be seen as simply highly evolved organisms. He talks about a simple example of cooking a meal, where a group sits around the dinner table which even at this ordinary aspect of existence therein one observes a vast number of choices. Those multiple choices, inclusive of the use of grammar, the celebratory or ritualistic aspects can’t currently be explained by evolution, according to Tallis. They are largely absent in the feeding habits of the upper echelons of the animal kingdom just as there are no direct credible links in our evolutionary journey to their existence.    

“I of the Vortex”

At this point in the discussion paper it is opportune to introduce the author’s ideas. Beginning with the earlier chapters, they are mostly technical in nature, but I will attempt to summarise so as to ensure the context is maintained in the story so far. 

He clarifies some notions when dealing with the scientific aspect of the mind. Firstly he is a monist who sees the mind as the product of the brain which is in contrast to Tallis. In other words the mind and the brain are inseparable. All sensory functionality occurs in the brain which he further classified into motorised sensorial images. He summarises his idea of the brain as a living entity that generates well defined electrical activity. Mystery of the mind he asserts is tied up with all of the functionality in the various processes involved in thinking, consciousness and dreaming which are removed from the external world and purely mind dependent within the brain. His links movement and mind as deeply related: different parts of the same process. He then gives a historical account of this thinking to move on to the intrinsic nature of brain functionality, given the independent nature of the central nervous system. The next step is to make the transition to an explanation of neuronal functionality, their oscillating nature, resonance and rhythmic coherence, of which the motor aspect is driven by muscle force. There seems little point in doing more than a cursory acknowledgment to this functionality given its technical aspects can be assumed to be correct and don’t deal directly with the question of how we see ourselves. What is of interest is how he views evolution as leading one down the path to an explanation of how the mind simply arose.

Herein his theory is opposed by Tallis, so a brief explanation is in order. According to Llanas this transition occurred at a critical time to support life as it moved on to multicellular organisms which were then dependent on a central nervous system for survival to allow for movement as distinct from plants for instance. He introduces the sea squirts with a primitive central nervous system by way of example and concludes the evolutionary development of a nervous system is an exclusive property of actively moving creatures. He then moves on to the predictable qualities that give advantage and control of movement, resulting in its efficiency and in tune with its regulatory nature and synergies that save time in the mind's development in the brain.

 To summarise at this point: predictability is crucial through sensorial motor dependent formulation of the external world which is contextualised in the brain and secondly this operation is carried out in such an efficient manner as it conserves energy. Page 38 'I of the Vortex'.  

Turning now to Tallis we find he is indeed highly critical of this thinking 

 Neuromania 

Tallis contends the most profound differences in humanity lie in our uniqueness and that the mind is not just the product of the material brain. This is apparent in the freedom and inherent ability to help one another and to share experiences so as to add to our accumulated knowledge. Neuromania, as he calls it, on the other hand, makes the outlandish claim consciousness is no different to the beasts in that it is solely the province of brain functioning. So that neuroscience thinks it is on the verge of unlocking the key to what human nature is, possibly by simply peering into the darkness of the human skull using techniques that record neuronal activity. The impossibility of accommodating consciousness with evolutionary theory is summarised by Tallis as follows:

·  The impossibility of accommodating the emergence and elaboration of consciousness within evolutionary theory;  

·  The failure of neuroscience- ultimately a branch of physical science – to account for the intentionality of mental contents. More on this later

·  The neurologically inexplicable transformation of sense perception into propositional or factual awareness and understanding that is amenable to unlimited elaboration into a vast body of knowledge; and  

·   The development of a human world, in which one actively lives, offsets from nature. . 

 

Pages 46 Seeing Ourselves

 

Intentionality

For Tallis, intentionality is a crucial element to his proposition that marks a distance of conscious beings [whether human or non-human} to the material world, but in relation to humans opens a much greater difference to that of the animal kingdom. Intentionally he defines our relationship with our bodies, modes of being in time, selfhood and agency. He defines intentionally as the power of the mind to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. As per the definition by Franz Brentano 

When we refer to things as in our perceptions or memories they have an “aboutness”: they are directed to or about something sensed as being other than perceiving. Mental phenomena contain the object by being about an object intentionally within themselves. That is not to confuse the ordinary use of the word. The end result is that of a shared world experience and not just me. In that sense intentionality is an effective rebuttal to the neuronal argument which can only be of itself and conscious experiences about a world other than that which has provided a vast literature.

What Tallis argues is the neuro-philosophers such as Daniel Dennett, don't seem concerned the vast majority of inputs into the senses don’t finish up in our consciousness but in the sub-consciousness. They subscribe to the belief there can only be one kind of stuff namely matter, which is further endorsed by John Searle. Tallis responds that we can prove the falsehood of this entire of materialism as in all there is matter by simply seeing an object such as a glass in front of you. 

He explains his thoughts as follows: 

Casual input into my brain arising from the glass 

Light energy entering into eyes and eventually stimulating my visual vortex 

Result is a set of events in the glass 

Let Cause =C at time T 

At the start then of a causal sequence terminating in neural activity is the visual cortex 

Effect E= at time T 

The inward casual chain from C to E is a necessary condition of my true experience that there is a glass in front of me. However, it is not a sufficient condition, or at least a sufficient explanation, of my experience, for there is a second aspect of that experience, namely the “aboutness”. 

Hence the events previously described have to reach back to the glass via the intermediate events, to the events C in the glass at T in order to be about the glass. The light getting into the eye, passing from the object to the eye - which we might call rele- reception and the gaze looking out at the object out there - which we might call tele projection are not the same. There is nothing in the explanations of the brain that provides a satisfactory explanation of the interaction between the glass and the light incident upon it. A similar example is provided via billiard balls colliding with one another. Pages 51 ‘Seeing Ourselves’  

 

Finally, on evolution Thomas Nagel expresses the view Evolution may explain why creatures with vision or reason will survive, but does not explain how vision or reasoning are possible. The possibilities of minds forming progressively more objective conceptions of reality is not something the theory of natural selection can attempt to explain …..since it does not explain possibilities at all, only selection.

For further reading https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02091/full

 Discussion points 

Bear in mind at this early stage there is still a lot of ground to cover. Nevertheless there is ample room for initial discussions as to whether or not we believe the materialistic view of ourselves is valid or not. That is, do we see ourselves solely as organisms generated by evolutionary forces or not? Does that matter ?  

If we are of either view how do feel about the methodologies presented ? What do we think about a non-physical spiritual view? If that be the case then the materialistic view might argue equally that the neurons then pose mysterious personal qualities?

Which view do we feel more comfortable with and the reasons?

Can we have a mixture of both?