Dr Gary Cox opens up G.E. Moore’s ethics, and his open question argument invites
plenty of discussion as contained in the latest issue of Philosophy Now.
He introduces the idea in philosophy
there are those who believe exclusively in the principle of the underlying
facts to determine what is right or wrong and those who don’t. One of the
foremost of thinkers with strong views against a sole reliance on the facts is David
Hume (1711-1776). A brief introduction
is as follows:
Hume’s position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will,
but rather is the “slave of the passions”.
Moral distinctions are not derived from reason. Moral distinctions are derived from the moral
sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt
by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action. While some virtues
and vices are natural, others, including justice, are artificial.
Cohon, Rachel, "Hume's Moral Philosophy", The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (fall 2018 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/hume-moral/>.
Hume introduces the idea of the naturalistic
fallacy; based on a false assumption something that happens naturally must be
ethical. An example is incest which occurs amongst animals but only brings
feelings of repugnancy when observed amongst humans. In contrast acts of kindness
and honesty stirs up our emotions that gain cognitive approval. Hence Hume argues
morality is not simply a matter of reason but of approval communicated through
the senses in accord with our desires and volition.
Hume further notes there is no legitimate way to move from a
statement of observable facts to a statement of moral values: in short, that it
is impossible to get an ought from an is. This idea has come to be known
as Hume’s Law, the is-ought problem, or the is-ought gap. Page 25 April- May
Philosophy Now 2021.
Interestingly
enough Hume’s view on morality is similar to those of Frederick Nietzsche who
considered it absurd to apply one moral code to everyone. In his essay entitled
‘Good and Evil’ Nietzsche talks about bad conscience where one is prone to
inhibit instincts for aggression to turn them inward upon ourselves.
He wanted to return to antiquity and the free
spirits of the Homeric Greeks. This is the old world of appeal because it
relies on instinctiveness and an inherent freedom, of inner lights and life
affirmation to exemplify the joyful here and now. It encompasses aristocratic
ideals that are not subject to the mediocrity of democratic governance, nor the
whims of others or societal pressure.
However the question arises as to how practical is
it to rely on this noble spirit and instinctiveness?
By instinctiveness Nietzsche doesn’t use
the word as in nature. Rather, that which makes us human and allows us to
intuitively avoid becoming slaves within one ideology.
For Nietzsche personally there was also a crisis in his faith as he
believed all religions were unable to provide the truth. That truth he believed
was that it is the responsibility of humanity who must discern for
themselves what is true and good. The point is of course such terms and his
values are never clearly defined nor does he ever pinpoint any system of
governance he envisages. Rather all we have is his vision of the overman and
his accompanying works.
But Cox introduces to a more practical application concerning
the work of GE Moore (1873- 1958) who championed the work of Hume and aimed his
criticism against moral system based on Hume’s naturalistic fallacy to argue against
utilitarism. The error Moore saw in the
work of Utilitarian Philosophers such as Bentham and Mills was to equate pleasure
with good. Moore saw through such
statements as open ended so that the answer always remains open to debate and
can never be closed.
Moore suggested an intuitive intellect or moral
faculty that relate to human beings that inform us in relation to matters of
ethics.
His views have held up over time and provides a
valuable contributor to lively ongoing debates. I think they provide plenty of
food for thought and discussion, He was to modify his views in later life that
are summed up by Cox.
The beauty of a beautiful statue, painting, woman, man, house, bridge or
mountain, requires a combination of natural properties, because without its
natural properties the beautiful thing would not exist. However, the beauty of
a thing is not one of its natural properties, but is instead a non-natural
property that transcends the
natural properties. In the same way, according to Moore, the non-natural
property of goodness transcends the
natural objects, emotions, actions, attitudes, and habits that we hold to be
most valuable and broadly describe as ‘good’.
It is perhaps ironic that after developing to the full Hume’s insight vis-à-vis
the naturalistic fallacy, Moore ends up endorsing a rather exotic metaphysics
of non-natural properties existing in a supersensible dimension intuited by
some higher intellectual faculty. Hume, who in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) condemns
all metaphysical writings as
containing ‘nothing but sophistry and illusion’ which ought to be
‘consigned to the flames’, would not approve at all!
Towards the end of Principia
Ethica, Moore advocates a variant of utilitarianism called ideal utilitarianism. Intrinsic
value, he says, does not belong to pleasure or even to happiness, as classical
utilitarians maintain, but to the consciousness of beauty and friendship. He
argues that of all things in life, consciousness of beauty and consciousness of
friendship are the most valuable, worth having purely for their own sakes and
not merely for the sake of something else. These things are not synonymous with
goodness, but they are the highest goods, in the sense of being the most
valuable things in life and, therefore, the things that should be pursued and
promoted above all else. Consciousness of beauty and consciousness of
friendship are the ends to which all else should be a means.
Conclusion Page 26 Philosophy Now April / May 2021.
Conclusion
Mostly we don’t need a judge or the law to
distinguish what is right or wrong accept that our views are also shaped by our
culture and environment. I am not sure about a greater good but I do think his
idea of the importance of consciousness of beauty and friendship rates highly
(if not the top of the tree) in our existence. Even in the judicial world where
hard evidence is cited as the persuader those facts are in turn swayed by our
intuitive feelings at the time. Imagine trying someone for a very serious offence
based purely on the facts so that one is left with no involvement with anyone
other than to read the respective narratives and rebuttals.
